Between “War and Peace” or “Europe and Russia”: Georgia’s Geopolitical Path on the Ballot

Critical Questions by Tina Dolbaia, Benjamin Shefner, andMaria Snegovaya

Published October 18, 2024

On October 26, Georgia will hold pivotal parliamentary elections, which have been commonly referred to as the "referendum for or against Europe" by pro-Western citizens and Western observers of Georgia. Previously regarded as the most fervent strategic partner to both the United States and the European Union in Eurasia, the country's Euro-Atlantic future is now at risk. Against this backdrop, some 3.7 million Georgians will soon cast their votes to elect 150 members of the parliament for a four-year term, who will in turn be responsible for defining the main directions of Georgia's domestic and foreign policies.

Why do the upcoming elections in such a small country matter? This piece answers this question by overviewing the preelection environment in Georgia and the reasons behind the current government's controversial and seemingly self-destructive policy decisions, followed by the discussion on possible election outcomes and their implications on local, regional, and geopolitical contexts.

Q1: What has been threatening Georgia's Euro-Atlantic path?

A1: Throughout 2024, Georgia has been embroiled in domestic tensions, which have soured its relations with its Western partners. In June, Georgia's ruling party, the Georgian Dream (GD), passed a highly contested bill on "transparency of foreign influence," requiring media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to receive more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources to register as "agents of foreign influence." The bill, which caused an unprecedented public outcry, bears a striking resemblance with the Russian foreign agent law and is believed to have been adopted by the GD parliamentarians to stigmatize, persecute, and silence independent voices in the country. Among other controversial legislation recently passed by the GD-majority parliament is a new tax law presumed to allow businesses to move illicit money into Georgia tax free and a law on "family values and protection of minors," which mirrors similar Russian legislation and significantly curtails the rights of sexual minorities in Georgia.

In response to the country's rapidly accelerating democratic backsliding, Washington has imposed financial restrictions and travel bans on high-ranking GD officials, while Brussels has halted Georgia's EU accession process. Tbilisi has also been stripped of $95 million in U.S. funding and €132 million in EU funding. Contrary to Western criticism, however, GD has received praise for its domestic policymaking from Kremlin officials and propagandists. China's rising role in Georgia, exemplified by Beijing's involvement in the country's major infrastructure and trade projects, is also seen as a continuation of GD's changing geopolitical priorities.

Q2: What does the preelection environment look like in Georgia?

A2: Tbilisi's preelection environment is increasingly polarized, setting the stage for heightened tensions. The controversial law on "transparency of foreign influence" poses a significant threat to activists, journalists, and election monitoring organizations by imposing onerous financial reporting requirements and granting sweeping investigative powers to Georgia's Ministry of Justice to penalize noncompliant organizations. Nearly all independent NGOs have refused to register, as they see registration as a de facto admission to the government's accusations that independent media and civil society work for foreign interests, not the Georgian people. This refusal makes enforcement of the new legislation a threat to independent efforts to safeguard the integrity of the parliamentary elections. While it has yet to be enforced, Georgia's Constitutional Court's decision against suspending the law while reviewing the case opens the possibility for last-minute preelection implementation.

While the law itself poses an existential threat to Georgia's vibrant civil society, the ruling party's broader campaign of extra-judicial intimidation against independent voices and opposition figures underscores the extent of their departure from democratic norms. As riot police used batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets to stifle protests against the law this spring, coordinated groups of thugs, referred to as "titushki," carried out targeted attacks on activists, journalists, and opposition politicians. Homes and offices of leading activists and journalists have been vandalized with threats and expletives, posters depicting civil society members as traitors and enemies adorn the streets of Tbilisi, and thousands of citizens received anonymous phone calls threatening them and their families if they continue to speak out against the government's actions. Months after the protest movement subsided, opposition leaders continue to face the threat of political violence, particularly in the regions outside of Tbilisi.

Far from distancing itself from the chaos or staying above the political fray, GD has leaned into radical and increasingly apocalyptic rhetoric as the election draws nearer, embracing conspiracy theories and brazenly promising political retribution on opponents. The main champion of these ideas is Bidzina Ivanishvili, a reclusive oligarch and founder of GD, who has claimed that the "global war party"-a deep-state-like amalgamation of shadowy figures in the West, Ukraine, and Georgia-was actively interfering in the country through support for NGOs and using Georgia to open a "second front" with Russia (hence the need for the "foreign influence" law). GD officials have called for banning the opposition, legally prosecuting them, and stripping parliamentary mandates from those elected to parliament.

Openly campaigning to turn Georgia into a one-party state, the government frames the choice as one between "war and peace." Campaign billboards depicting devastated cities in Ukraine have appeared all over the country, associating the opposition with war and destruction and the incumbents with peace and prosperity. Opposition parties, long divided and based on individual personalities rather than policy, uniformly posit this election as a choice between "Europe and Russia." All sides agree on one thing: this election is the most consequential in Georgia's independent history.

Q3: Why is GD pivoting away from the West?

A3: While the pace of Georgia's democratic decline and GD's seeming abandonment of Euro-Atlantic aspirations surprised many Western observers, the seeds of authoritarian development have been germinating for several years. Georgia's two recent prime ministers under GD, Irakli Garibashvili and Irakli Kobakhidze, exemplify a familiar brand of conservative ethno-nationalist populism, centered on polarizing sociocultural issues and Georgian sovereignty, and often extolling Hungary as their role model in the European Union. Domestically, the ruling party incrementally tightened its grip on independent institutions, including the judiciary, educational institutions, and the public defender's office, while souring relations with Western partners who have invested billions of dollars in the country's democratic development.

On the international stage, the government has attempted to chart a multi-vectored foreign policy, largely undeterred by U.S. or European criticism. These changes have become especially evident following, and perhaps catalyzed by, Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Without formally abandoning their EU or NATO aspirations (as public support for Georgia's EU and NATO memberships stands at around 80 percent and 67 percent, respectively), GD officials have steadily ramped up criticism of Western partners for their alleged intervention in Georgia's internal affairs. While the United States and the European Union have been critical of Georgia's democratic backsliding, their efforts (including recent sanctions against GD officials and aid freezes) have been consistently focused on preserving the country's democratic gains and European trajectory.

Georgia's efforts to improve relations with Russia and sign a strategic partnership agreement with China only serve to further damage Tbilisi's already fragile Euro-Atlantic relations. The main proponent of this policy of realignment is Bidzina Ivanishvili, who believes the war in Ukraine will end soon, leaving the country in ruins. This, in turn, will lay bare a multipolar geopolitical reality where U.S. and European relations are not necessarily the primary driver of economic development or the most significant security guarantee. Additionally, neither Russia nor China criticize the government for its authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, improved ties with the world's two largest authoritarian powers give GD greater leeway to exert domestic control with impunity.

Importantly, Ivanishvili, who has concentrated decisionmaking circles in his own hands, appears to truly believe aspects of the conspiracies at the center of his party's campaign. He repeatedly stated that he lives under de facto U.S. sanctions, despite fervent denials by Washington, and continues to publish letters detailing the plots of the "Global War Party," which he claims to enjoy "substantive influence over the politicians and bureaucrats in both the U.S. and the EU." His refusal to engage with foreign government representatives or interlocutors complicates Western diplomatic efforts to resolve these growing tensions. Now that he is formally heading GD's electoral list, it is clear ultimate decisionmaking power in Georgia belongs exclusively to Ivanishvili, as does responsibility for the country's authoritarian turn.

Q4: Can GD secure a majority of seats in the parliament?

A4: Prior to spring 2024, GD was slowly losing popular support, dropping from 54 percent in 2012, when the party came to power, to 48 percent in 2020, when the last parliamentary elections were held. GD successfully secured a parliamentary majority as its leaders were able to navigate between appeasing Georgia's largely pro-Western population and exercising caution with Russia, which continues to occupy 20 percent of the country's territory. For instance, while the GD government applied for Georgia's EU membership in March 2022, it simultaneously refused to join Western sanctions against Russia. In 2024, however, when GD adopted a string of highly controversial laws, fully disregarding U.S. and EU criticism and violently suppressing the public outcry, its popularity fell to a historic low. According to different polls, between 32 and 36 percent of the population supports GD, while public support of the four major pro-Western opposition parties stands at 49-54 percent. GD leaders have officially disregarded these results, instead claiming that the party enjoys 60 percent voter support. However, it is also apparent that they are getting wary of the possible defeat. For instance, Prime Minister Kobakhidze has recently pledged to "reestablish relations with everyone, including the 'global war party'" after the elections.

Furthermore, a crucial note about the new format of the upcoming elections is that all 150 seats will now be awarded under a fully proportional system-the result of an EU-brokered deal between GD and the opposition to reform the electoral system and end a political crisis following the 2020 parliamentary elections. This means that each political party crossing a 5 percent threshold will now be able to obtain seats in the parliament based on the total percentage of votes it receives in the elections.

Therefore, in addition to recent poll results, the switch to a fully proportional electoral system makes it difficult to imagine GD's outright victory or the opposition's complete defeat. The most likely scenario, according to this logic, would be a coalition government in Tbilisi, curbing GD's power. However, there are significant concerns over electoral malfeasance, including vote buying, ballot stuffing, carousel voting, misusing the state and administrative resources, and depriving citizens living outside of Georgia of the right to vote. Additionally, even if the civil society manages to overcome these obstacles on election day and GD fails to secure a majority of seats, the political environment in Georgia is still deeply polarized. If the opposition refuses to form a single bloc after the elections, GD may remain the most powerful party in the parliament.

Q5: Why are these elections significant within the current regional and geopolitical contexts?

A5: Elections in Georgia are taking place against the backdrop of a greater geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus, prompted in part by the war in Ukraine. Armenia is attempting to pivot away from Russia and more toward the West, especially after Russia chose to stand on the sidelines while Azerbaijan expelled the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, appears to be strengthening its ties with Russia and China, most recently by applying to join the expanding BRICS alliance, following Russian president Vladimir Putin's visit to the country. If GD secures a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections, this will further solidify an ongoing regional shift toward authoritarian powers. Armenia alone, without Georgia, will not be able to pursue a Western-focused policy of diversification.

Such an outlook for the South Caucasus should be troubling both for the European Union and the United States. In the case of Brussels, the region plays a key role in economic and trade routes developed between Europe and Asia, with more EU-funded infrastructure projects underway, which will require reliable regional partners. For Washington, growing Chinese political and economic clout around the world remains a bipartisan issue. Should GD prevail in the elections, these trends will accelerate and Georgia-the most vocal pro-Western country in Eurasia-will inevitably be subjugated to Russian and Chinese influences along with the entire region. Alternatively, if the democratic opposition comes to power in the parliament by putting the interests of the country above internal divisions, Georgia would once again be able to demonstrate that democratic frameworks can be resilient against authoritarian playbooks-a powerful reminder not only for fledgling but also the most experienced democracies around the world.

Tina Dolbaia is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Benjamin Shefner is an assistant program officer for Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.

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