Calvert Remarks at Oversight Hearing on Navy Shipbuilding

Secretary Del Toro, I asked you to appear before this subcommittee to have a candid conversation about the failure of the Navy's shipbuilding programs.

This subcommittee is a strong supporter of the Navy, in particular our submarine programs. The Columbia-class submarines will host 70% of our nation's nuclear deterrent. The Virginia-class submarines are the lynchpin of our strategy to outmatch China.

However, submarines and ships only contribute to the fight if they actually exist - not just on paper.

In a word, these programs are in crisis. Without exception, they are falling behind. Increasingly, they are over budget. Absent today's intervention, I have zero confidence that Navy shipbuilding will get back on track.

The Columbia-class submarine program has slipped over 3 years and is significantly over budget. The Virginia-class submarine program has slipped 2-3 years and is experiencing extraordinary cost growth.

The Constellation-class frigate program is experiencing a 3-year schedule overrun because the Navy chose to move forward with construction before the design was completed. The Marines' amphibious ship program faces potentially costly risks in both requirements and design. The USS Enterprise's schedule continues to slip, and the cost of this carrier has increased by 27%.

Secretary Del Toro, your 45-day shipbuilding review found a litany of problems related to design maturity, first-of-class transitions, production, design workforce, acquisition and contract strategy, supply chain, skilled workforce, and government workforce. Frankly, the only reason we're not discussing Nunn-McCurdy breaches is that the Navy's system of keeping metrics and reporting facts is murky and flawed at best-misleading at worst.

It's not clear to me that anyone has accurate information about the trajectory of any shipbuilding program other than the Program Executive Officers - and since they switch out every two years, the options for long-term accountability are limited.

This subcommittee expects honesty and transparency from the Navy. Not only has the Navy withheld information on costs and delays, but the Navy's plans to address this crisis are primarily aspirational. We need plans with metrics to see whether you are actually fixing problems, or just putting Band-Aids on the issues.

In 2017, the Navy announced a 2-year slip in the Columbia schedule, meaning each Columbia submarine would be ready just in time to replace the retiring Ohio-class platform. At the time, Navy leadership insisted that there was no margin left in the Columbia program, asserting that this program is the top priority. Every other program could fail, but this one would not.

And yet, earlier this year when you announced that Columbia would have an additional 12-to-16-month delay, the Chief of Naval Operations told Congress that Columbia would still be on time.

The math is equally convoluted in the Virginia-class submarine program, which was on a 6-month accelerated schedule but is now delayed by 2-to-3-years. Somehow, the Navy continues to assert that commitments to INDOPACOM and our AUKUS partners remain on track.

This causes me to question whether you actually believe your rhetoric on the state of these programs, despite the facts.

The Navy is supposed to build one Columbia and two Virginia-class submarines a year. However, today the Navy is struggling to construct just 1.3 Virginia-class submarines per year, and Columbia is falling behind.

Congress has provided over $10 billion in additional shipbuilding industrial base funding since fiscal year 2018 more than the Pentagon has requested.

In fiscal year 2024 alone, Congress enacted almost $20 billion for our submarine programs, including $3 billion in supplemental funds for the submarine industrial base and $16 billion for the procurement of Columbia and Virginia-class submarines, advance procurement and additional submarine industrial base funding in the base budget.

We have since learned from the Department's anomaly request that this funding was still somehow at least $1.95 billion short. We have also learned that there is a projected $17 billion shortfall in the Virginia-class program alone over the next six years.

It's clear that the Navy and shipbuilders have known about this shortfall for at least 18 months, when discussions on the Shipbuilding Accountability and Workforce Support, or SAWS, proposal began. Assurances of how long these discussions have been going on do not reassure me, when Congress was notified just two weeks ago.

Absent this CR, I don't know when Congress would have been made aware of this massive shortfall.

We are now working with OMB, the shipbuilders, and the Navy to better understand the $1.95 billion supplemental funding request and the SAWS proposal. I am skeptical that either will successfully get these fiscal year 2024 Virginia submarines under contract.

Tomorrow this committee will hear from the shipbuilders.

Today, we will have a frank conversation about the Navy's program management failures, flawed use of metrics, and lack of transparency. For too long, this committee has been put in a position of asking what the Navy is hiding behind the curtain - it's time to pull down the curtain altogether.

I am fully committed to increasing the size of the Navy and improving shipbuilding, as reflected in the defense appropriations bills that have been put forward by this committee during my chairmanship. My support for Navy shipbuilding is unwavering, but I no longer trust that this committee is being given sufficient information required for meaningful oversight.

I hold both the Navy and the shipbuilders responsible. However, the Navy is the customer and the program manager. It is your responsibility to conduct oversight and to come up with innovative solutions to get these programs back on track and stop the outrageous cost increases. It is also your responsibility to communicate with Congress.

The lack of transparency from the Navy, the failure of shipbuilders to urgently resolve issues, and the resulting inability of Congress to conduct informed analysis is a toxic cycle that we must break.

I am accountable to the taxpayers and, Mr. Secretary, you are accountable to me.

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